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Professor Chiara Giorgetti teaches and writes in the
areas of international law, international arbitration,
international dispute resolution, and state failure and
fragility. She has authored over a dozen publications on
these topics, and her JSD doctoral dissertation resulted in
the publication of her book, A PrincipledApproach to State
Failure, International Community Actions in Emergency

Situations, in 2010. Prior to joining the Richmond Law
faculty in 2012, Professor Giorgetti practiced international
arbitration in Washington D.C. and Geneva, Switzerland.
Professor Giorgetti also worked extensively with the
United Nations in New York and Somalia, where she
oversaw the implementation of United Nations
Development Programme governance programs. She has
served as a consultant for various international
organizations and non-governmental organizations and
taught advanced international courses at Georgetown Law
Center. Professor Giorgetti clerked at the International
Court of Justice in The Hague. She is an active member of
the American Society of International Law (ASIL) and cochaired its 2011 annual meeting. She also founded and cochairs ASIL's Interest Group on International Courts and
Tribunals.
REMARKS:

I would like to thank the organizers of this event for
inviting me to talk today about a topic which is both timely
and important: The Arab Spring and Syria. I was asked to
be brief and provocative, and I hope that I can do both in
my presentation. I would like to make three points. First, I
would like to briefly discuss the doctrine of Responsibility
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to Protect, and its legal and political implications. Then, I
will examine how the Responsibility to Protect doctrine has

been recently applied in Libya. Finally, building on these
two elements, I will assess the applicability of the
Responsibility to Protect principle in the context of the

crisis in Syria.
To start, the Responsibility to Protect is a doctrine

that, among other things, and at its maximum, allows
members of the international community or a state to
intervene to address mass atrocities and human rights
abuses in another State, which causes these mass
atrocities. This doctrine, also known as R2P, has been a
much-discussed topic since 2000 in international law,
international politics, and international relations. R2P has
been both a promising and, at the same time, a
disappointing concept.
Conventional wisdom says that R2P was developed as a
reaction to the United Nations (U.N.) and the Security
Council's lack of action in Rwanda and Yugoslavia (both
in Bosnia and Kosovo). It was meant as a way to overcome
the deadlock created by the veto-based voting system of the
Security Council and to ensure that the international
community would address gross violations of human rights
effectively.
In my view, it is more correct to see the
development of the R2P as a policy reinterpretation of the
U.N.'s role, in general, in intervention to maintain

See infra, Rep. of the Int'l Comm'n on Intervention & State
Sovereignty, The Responsibility To Protect, 6 (2001), available at

http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf; See also
generally, Saira Mohamed, Taking Stock of the Responsibility to

Protect, 48 Stan. J. Int'l L, 319 (2012).
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international peace and security. 2 As such, it comes in the
aftermath, not only of inaction in Rwanda and Yugoslavia,
but also of the attempted first interventions in Somalia, East
Timor, Iraq, and Haiti. This means that R2P comes at a
time when the U.N. is trying to redefine a role for itself in
international crises and on matters that were newly
considered to be a "threat to international peace and
security." Therefore, it is a continuation of the rebalancing
of the sovereignty and intervention dichotomy, and it
addresses the question of to whom sovereignty belongs.
The R2P debate continues the discussion on sovereignty
that belongs to the people and not to the State, and
intervention as protection of that sovereignty. 3
R2P provides a framework for action so that the
international community and other States have a right of
intervention in cases of mass human rights violations. This
right is rephrased as a duty and as an obligation that States
have to intervene in case of egregious mass violations of
human rights. It is structured as an intervention to
overcome the veto-holding powers in the Security Council
so that States have to act and have a justification or reason
to act.
2 See

U.N. Charter art. 1 (stating that the first purpose of the United
Nations is "to maintain international peace and security, and to that
end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of
aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."); See also U.N.
Charter art 41 ("the Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken
[...], to maintain or restore international peace and security.").
3W

Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in

ContemporaryInternationalLaw, 84 Am. J Int'l L 866, 872 (1990).
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R2P was first discussed in a 2001 Canadian report
commissioned and published by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS). 4 The Report, called The Responsibility to Protect,
provides for an escalating three-prong process: First, the
state itself has a primary duty to prevent mass human rights
violation. Second, it is the duty of the state itself to protect
civilians. Third, and only if the first two procedures fail,
there is a duty to intervene by outside States.5 Throughout
this process, the role of the Security Council in securing
peace remains.
In 2005, the U.N. World Summit endorsed the
Responsibility to

Protect doctrine

in

its

Outcome

Document, which was also formally adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly. As adopted, the RP2 was much scaled
down and diluted. The Outcome Document provides that:
138. Each individual State
has the responsibility to
protect its populations form
genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against
humanity. This responsibility
entails the prevention of such
crimes,
including
their
incitement,
through
appropriate and necessary
means.

4 Rep.

of the Int'l Comm'n on Intervention & State Sovereignty,

The Responsibility To Protect, 6 (2001), available at

http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
Id.
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139. ...We [States] are
prepared to take collective
action, in a timely and
decisive manner, through the
Security
Council,
in
accordance with the Charter,
including Chapter VII, on a
case-by-case
basis,
in
cooperation with relevant
regional organizations, as
appropriate, should peaceful
means be inadequate and
authorities
national
manifestly fail to protect their
populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing
against
crimes
and
humanity.6
And so this is my first provocative point: R2P was very
important politically in trying to reframe the issue of
intervention differently, but legally it didn't really change
anything. The role of the Security Council is maintained
and the initial responsibility to protect remains on the State.
In the Outcome Document, as paragraph 139 demonstrates,
states essentially agree to act in accordance to the UN
Charter. In 2005, States further diluted R2P by restricting
and defining the mass violations that would entail the
intervention and responsibility to protect.
The second provocative point relates to the
intervention in Libya in 2011, often considered and
6 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 1 138-39, U.N.

Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005), available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO5/487/60/PDF/NO548760.pdf?OpenEl
ement.
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presented as a triumph of R2P. The Economist said that is
was finally R2P in action. But if one looks at the language
of the U.N. Security Council resolution 1973/2011, it only
states that the responsibility to protect its people rests with
the Libyan government.
There is no mention of the
responsibility to protect in reference to the international
community. The mandate that gave power to NATO and
other States, and created sanctions, was based on a different
principle, not R2P. The resolution provides
The Security Council acting
under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the United
Nations, authorized members
states that have notified the
Secretary General, acting
nationally or through regional
organizations
or
arrangements, and acting in
cooperation
with
the
Secretary General "to take all
necessary

measures

...

to

protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under threat
of attack" in Libya. 9
The third provocative point is about Syria. Is the
Responsibility to Protect going to be something that can

help resolve the Syrian crisis? I think that it is very
unlikely that this will happen. Not only as an R2P, but also
7 The Lessons of Libya, Economist, May 21, 2011, available at

http://www.economist.connode/1 8709571.
S.C. Res. 1973
3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011)
available at

http://www.un.org/ga/search/view-doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1973(2011)
9 S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (March 17, 2011).
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generally as an act of intervention, the Syrian crisis is much
more complicated than the crisis in Libya. Political and
economic issues are very different from those that were
present in Libya, and are much more complex. But
furthermore, because of what happened in Libya and how
the R2P principle is seen as having been applied in Libya, I
think it is even less likely that the principle would be
applied in Syria.10 Unless major changes occur, I doubt we
will see any R2P intervention and use of military force
sanctioned by the U.N. to protect the people of Syria.
Thank you, and I look forward to your comments
and questions.
Post-Script: Few months after delivering these
remarks, the situation in Syria has not changed. The civil
war continues and the international community has been
unable to agree to intervene to protect civilians. At the end
of April 2013, however, President Obama declared that the
use of chemical weapons against civilians would be a
"game changer."

10See Charles Homans, Responsibility to Protect:A Short History,
FOREIGN POL'Y, Nov. 2011, at 34-35, available at

http://www.foreignpolicy.conarticles/20 11/10/11/responsibility to pr
otect a short history.
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